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Abstract
Climate change adaptation is a complex field of public policy that requires action by multiple levels of government, the
private sector, and civil society. In recent years, increasing scholarly attention has been focused on the governance of
adaptation, which has included exploring alternatives to state-centric models of decision-making and identifying appro-
priate roles and responsibilities of multiple actors to achieve desired outcomes. Scholars have called for greater clarity
in distinguishing between different approaches to adaptation governance. Drawing on the rich scholarship about public
governance, this article articulates and applies a typology of four modes of governance by which adaptation takes place
(hierarchy, market, network, and community). Using examples of initiatives from across Canada, the article offers a frame-
work for describing, comparing, and evaluating the governance of adaptation initiatives.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is a global problem that has impacts on
all sectors and demands adaptive responses from both
public and private actors. Climate change adaptation is
a complex policy area that requires “effective and si-
multaneous management and coordination of both top-
down and bottom-up approaches” (Dickinson & Burton,
2011, p. 103). Summarizing the state of adaptation plan-
ning and implementation in the Fifth Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Mimura et al. (2014, p. 873) wrote:
As adaptation activities progress, many challenges
have emerged, such as how to manage the decision-
making process, how to develop strategies and plans,
and how to implement them. In this regard, the roles
within multilevel governance become an issue, such
as horizontal coordination among different agencies
and departments, and vertical coordination of various
stakeholders from regional, national, to local actors.
These vertical and horizontal coordination challenges
have sparked growing interest in “adaptation gover-
nance”, defined here as the patterns of coordination
among actors, including the direction of authority and
the dominant instruments used to achieve objectives.
Recent research has analyzed the coordination of adap-
tation initiatives that emerge in a top-down (i.e., state-
directed) and bottom-up (i.e., locally mobilized) fash-
ion (Bauer & Steurer, 2014; Wellstead, Howlett, Nair,
& Rayner, 2016), explored the process of problem def-
inition and timing (Huitema et al., 2016), and analyzed
policy instruments and instrument selection (Henstra,
2016; Mees et al., 2014). Adaptation governance schol-
ars have sought tomake sense of a complex environment
involving multiple levels of government, fragmented re-
sources and responsibilities among public, private, and
civil society actors, and overlapping networks of activ-
ity. Mapping out a research agenda on adaptation gov-
ernance, Huitema et al. (2016, p. 13) argued that “‘gov-
ernors’ in the climate adaptation domain need to de-
fine the problems they face, choose at what jurisdic-
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tional level action will be undertaken, decide when ac-
tion will be taken, and through which modes of gover-
nance and instruments”.
The configuration of actors and their roles in adapta-
tion initiatives must be made clear in order for analysts
to describe, compare, and critique governance arrange-
ments. Much of the existing scholarly literature on adap-
tation assumes that it is, or should be, governed through
complex networks of interdependent actors. As the ty-
pology presented here demonstrates, however, polycen-
tricity and equality of input between state and non-state
actors is only one ideal vision of adaptation governance.
Networks, like all modes of governance, have consid-
erable weaknesses, so considering the characteristics
and dynamics of other modes of governance is useful
to identify alternative governance arrangements. Gover-
nance analysis must allow for “closing off” of distinct vi-
sions in order for analysis and comparison of alternatives
to be viable. To paraphrase Thompson (2003), for gov-
ernance to mean anything, it cannot mean everything.
When analyzing adaptation governance, therefore, schol-
ars could benefit from a typology that describes and
differentiates between multiple modes of governance
through classification.
In this article we argue that the study of adaptation
governance can be assisted by drawing on the broader
theoretical and conceptual exercises that have defined
the field of public governance. Topics such as whether
complex societal problems ought to be approached from
the bottom-up or the top-down, the nature of actor
networks, the choice of policy instruments, directions
of authority, and the deliberative process behind pol-
icy choices, have been the purview of governance schol-
ars for decades. We propose that a typology of gov-
ernance modes, which focuses on distinguishing actor
roles, instrument selection, and direction of authority,
holds value in making sense of adaptation governance
for descriptive, comparative, and critical purposes.
The typology dates to Weberian analysis of state bu-
reaucracies, and it has been further refined by many
scholars (e.g., Bevir, 2012; Frances, Levacic, Mitchell, &
Thompson, 1991; Hall, 2011; Meuleman, 2008; Powell,
1991; Tenbensel, 2005; Thompson, 2003). Each mode of
governancewithin the typology embodies a distinct view
of societal coordination via the role of the state and other
actors. While it is far from novel, it has been fruitfully ap-
plied to other complex policy domains such as policing
(Fleming & Rhodes, 2005), waste (Bulkeley, Watson, &
Hudson, 2007), and tourism (Hall, 2011). However, it has
yet to be applied to adaptation in a systematic way.
Typologies provide researchers with conceptual clar-
ity and allow “the identification of discrete areas of pol-
itics, each area characterized by its own political struc-
ture, policy process, elites and group relations, power
structures, and policymaking processes that differ ac-
cording to the type of issue they deal with” (Hall, 2011,
p. 442). The typology presented here offers researchers
a framework for describing, comparing, and critically an-
alyzing adaptation governance processes and structures
across different impacts and sectors. Each mode of gov-
ernance comprises an internal logic regarding state roles
and acceptable instruments, so their explicit recognition
allows for better contextualization of adaptation initia-
tives for comparison and critique. For the adaptation
scholar, once a mode of governance has been identi-
fied, the typology, and the rich scholarship on which it
is based, offers valuable empirical and theoretical litera-
ture to draw upon.
Crucially, the typology reveals key normative assump-
tions behind distinct visions of adaptation governance,
as the four modes of governance rely on philosophical vi-
sions of state roles, policy instruments, and use of author-
ity (Dixon &Dogan, 2002). By elucidating the internal log-
ics of each mode, the typology highlights the very politi-
cal process of designing, steering, or allowing for adapta-
tion governance, thereby contributing to opening up the
“black box” of governance that has characterized much
of the adaptation research to date (Biesbroek et al., 2015;
Wellstead, Howlett, & Rayner, 2013). Through their com-
peting visions of acceptable social coordination, the rival-
rous ideal governance modes represent discrete visions
that when applied to a policy problem better facilitate
the discussion of just how an issue should be governed
(Meuleman, 2008).
The article begins by describing the four modes of
governance, including their underlying logic, unique fea-
tures, and strengths and weaknesses. It then applies
these governance modes to climate change adaptation
initiatives in Canada through reviewof public documents.
By identifying four distinct approaches to extreme rain-
fall and sectoral adaptation initiatives, we demonstrate
how the typology can be used to describe, compare, and
critique adaptation governance arrangements.
2. A Typology of Governance
At the core of any mode of governance is the fundamen-
tal role of the state (Pierre, 2000), so the typology uses
the relationship between actors and instruments to the
state as a keymetric of classification, recognizing that the
state always maintains its monopoly on the use of force.
This view is generally applied to all public governance ty-
pologies, many of which are variations of the original hi-
erarchy, market, and network approaches (e.g., Steurer,
2013; Treib, Bahr, & Falkner, 2007).
Before presenting the typology, a few clarifying
points are in order. First, limits of such a typology are
acknowledged. As Frances et al. (1991, p. 6) point out,
the modes “do not attempt to explain everything in one
grand intellectual sweep.” They work instead to highlight
different visions, values, and explicit expectations of gov-
ernance. The typology presented below outlines the gov-
ernance modes as ideal types, whereas in practice ele-
ments from more than one is typically present, and this
“mixing” is often the source of both governance effective-
ness and failure (Rhodes, 1997).
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Nonetheless, the distinction between ideal modes is
significant enough that differences should matter to the
policy scholar. It will be impossible to identify, or pro-
mote, effective adaptation governance strategies with-
out an adequate means of distinguishing their forms,
internal logics, and potential for conflict. As Tenbensel
(2005, p. 277) put it, “these ideal types can then be used
as heuristic devices for gaining a handle on the complex-
ity of actual public management practices, which involve
combinations and layering of differentmodes”. Given the
particular philosophy underlying each mode, they also
provide insight into the very political claims about how
an issue ought to be governed and which modes should
be applied to which problems.
Second, the modes of governance outlined below
may not capture the entirety of options for social co-
ordination. However, after examining the combinations
and sub-genres of each category, Meuleman (2008,
pp. 20–21), writing before the introduction of commu-
nity governance to the typology, concluded:
The use of the three ideal-types hierarchy, network,
and market, provided that they are not presented as
monolithic constructs but as sets of related character-
istics with a distinct internal logic, can provide a ba-
sic analytical tool for understanding governance. The
concepts of hierarchical, network, and market gover-
nance together offer a complete enough analytical
framework for explaining the conflicts and synergies
within and between governance approaches.
The identification of governancemodes can vary not only
in identifying “mixes” of these modes (as mentioned
above and described in a few cases below), but also
in shifts over time. Many adaptation initiatives emerge
from the typical policy cycle (problem identification, de-
liberation, implementation, monitoring) and therefore
might embody different governance modes throughout
the process. In this article we focus on initiatives that
have been carried out and are recognizable in public
presentation. Nonetheless, it is recognized that gover-
nance entails both structure (institutions and actor and
relations) as well as process (rules and implementation)
(Börzel & Risse, 2010). Here we focus largely on the lat-
ter through publicly available documents, which some-
times do not explicitly reveal full details regarding both
structure and processes. The more detailed information
an analyst can obtain regarding an adaptation initiative
the more confidently the mode of governance can be de-
scribed and critiqued. All four idealmodes of governance
are described below.
2.1. Hierarchical Governance
Hierarchical governance involves nested levels of state
authority, wherein each unit is subordinate to its vertical
superior, and in which tasks are divided into more man-
ageable forms (Bevir, 2012). In the realm of public gov-
ernance, hierarchies involve a chain of command from
elected officials, who set out strategic objectives which
public servants then implement through state activities.
Hierarchy is said to be a rational, effective model of or-
ganization, designed for clear purposes, with almost mil-
itaristic focus (Meuleman, 2008).
The primary actors in hierarchical governance are
state officials and those with whom the state wishes to
consult. The role of state organizations is determined
by their place within the hierarchy, wherein authority
moves from top to bottom. Non-state actors may be in-
formation providers but are “passive rule-takers” (Hall,
2011, p. 445). Dominant policy instruments are those typ-
ically associated with “command and control”, including
laws, regulations, permits, and state intervention into in-
dividual liberties (e.g., eminent domain). Elected officials
and senior bureaucrats determine policy needs and set
the agenda, while those in the lower ranks implement
the decisions.
Although it is fashionable to present hierarchy as anti-
quated, there remain clear instances of hierarchical gov-
ernance in modern democracies (Bevir, 2012). For in-
stance, policy fields related to security, law enforcement,
and public safety tend to have a strong hierarchical struc-
ture. As with all governancemodes, this reflects what so-
ciety deems is an appropriate (i.e., politically acceptable)
means of coordinating social life.
Hierarchical governance has a number of strengths.
First, it effectively secures democratic legitimacy via rep-
resentation, in that power flows from those with an elec-
toral mandate from voters. Second, hierarchical control
deals effectively with complex tasks (like adaptation) by
sub-dividing them and encouraging the development of
expertise. On the other hand, hierarchy is inflexible, has
difficulty addressing policy areas lacking a clear consen-
sus about desired outcomes and, in some cases, can sti-
fle innovation due to a lack of broader societal inputs
(Dixon & Dogan, 2002). Given the internal logic of hier-
archical governance, the selection of policy instruments
does not necessarily require input from producers or
consumers, as requisite information is known, or devel-
oped, by the state. At stake in hierarchical governance is
democratic responsiveness: if state mechanisms choose
to ignore public input, they will exercise state authority
with unmatched resistance, as is the case in authoritar-
ian regimes.
2.2. Market Governance
The driving logic behind market modes of governance
is that responses to complex issues are best coordi-
nated through the “invisible hand of the market” or
to a lesser extent, the use of market-driven behavioral
change. Although markets rely on the state to protect
property rights and legitimate currency, authority is dis-
persed amongst the individuals taking part in a transac-
tion, meaning all market participants hold some influ-
ence over its direction.
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Steering in this mode is therefore not top-down from
government, but the result of competition and negotia-
tion among market actors. Competition and negotiation
are determined by the nature of the markets, and the ex-
tent to which states intervene or are more “laissez-faire”
(Thompson, 2003). In more interventionist versions of
market governance, state instruments such as taxes, sub-
sidies, and even regulations are used to steer market par-
ticipants. In others, there is considerably less state in-
volvement and governance is marked primarily by the
processes of supply and demand. However, both forms
of market governance can be distinguished from hier-
archy because market principles shape interactions be-
tween actors and are the locus of authority in governing.
Beyond basic rules set by the state to facilitate market
mechanisms, consumers and producers (including gov-
ernments) interact and negotiate the nature of the policy
tools and determine market outcomes. The main actors
of market modes of governance are market participants,
and the state can be a participant, rule maker, or hands-
off observer (Hall, 2011).
The key strength of market governance is that both
“policy makers” and “policy takers” are empowered to
influence policy decisions by their actions in the mar-
ketplace. This approach is said to be reflexive and re-
sponsive to changes in society, and reflects market ide-
als of individual choice (Marshall, 1991), especially in its
more laissez-faire form (Thompson, 2003). The main lim-
itation of the market mode of governance stems from
the broader failure of market mechanisms to account
for negative externalities (Levacic, 1991). Even in the
more interventionist market modes, which are intended
to reduce negative externalities, there is a risk of mar-
ket failure. Furthermore, market governance is typically
deemed inappropriate for coordinating services that are
rights-based.
2.3. Network Governance
Networks were recognized towards the end of the twen-
tieth century as a “thirdway” of governing andhave been
a significant focus of the governance literature since the
1980s (Bevir, 2012). In distinguishing networks frommar-
kets and hierarchies as a means of coordinating social or-
der, Frances et al. (1991, p. 15) explained: “if it is price
competition that is the central coordinating mechanism
of the market and administrative orders that of hierar-
chy, then it is trust and cooperation that centrally articu-
lates networks”. Along with cooperation and trust, a cen-
tral component of networks (or so-called “new modes
of governance”) is the plurality of inputs. In this sense
the governance of issues benefits from the increased
involvement of stakeholder groups, non-governmental
organizations, and firms beyond those who are self-
interested (as is characteristic ofmarket governance). Au-
thority is then dispersed, flattened, and horizontal, and
negotiated where appropriate for the benefit of all net-
work actors.
As in market governance, the state is one actor
among many, but with significant authority and legiti-
macy to set the rules of the network, which is sometimes
called “metagovernance” (Jessop, 2004). However, the
extent to which the state is present to steer can vary, and
thus so can the form of networks (Börzel & Risse, 2010).
Typical policy instruments such as self-regulation, accred-
itation schemes, and codes of practice carry the distinct
component of “trust” that is not necessarily found in hi-
erarchical and market instruments (Hall, 2011). Network
governance relies on an internal logic of shared concerns
and interests, aswell as awillingness to cooperate. Equal-
ity of participants in this network is seen as an ideal, as-
suming that each participant brings to the table some re-
sources to address the issue.
Networks have several strengths as a mode of gov-
ernance. They are more participatory, flexible, and can
foster innovation to address difficult policy problems
through the inclusion of a broader range of actors and
novel ideas (Bevir, 2012; Provan & Milward, 2001; Whe-
lan, 2015). According to Rhodes (2000, p. 81), networks
work bestwhen “cross-sector,multi-agency co-operation
and production is required” and “flexibility to meet local-
ized, varied service demands as needed”. As such, net-
work approaches have been embraced as a possible solu-
tion to the cross-sectoral problems of adaptation (Baird,
Plummer, & Bodin, 2016).
However, network governance has significant limita-
tions. First, the decentering of the state can threaten the
democratic legitimacy of public policy, in that elected of-
ficials are no longer dominant,while thosewithout a pub-
lic mandate are empowered (Considine & Afzal, 2011).
In such a case, the network becomes a tool of powerful
network players able to steer not only other actors, but
the state as well, towards their desired policy outcomes
(Börzel, 2011). Second, decentering the state limits the
typical outcomes of networks to non-coercive tools, such
as best practices and recommendations. Third, the flex-
ibility of networks—the ability to take almost any form
and include almost any actor—is sometimes considered
a weakness of networks as much as a strength (Frances
et al., 1991). Finally, networks are often elitist and un-
representative due to their reliance on expert communi-
cators and those with resources to bring to the network
(Rhodes, 2000).
2.4. Community Governance
The notion of community governance was first proposed
by Pierre and Peters (2000). Tenbensel (2005) explained
that community governance embracesmany of the same
consensual and participatory ideals of network gover-
nance but steering rests at the local level. In some in-
stances, influence might be pressed upwards in order to
acquire resources for locally developed, but otherwise
autonomous, policies (Hall, 2011). As Tenbensel (2005,
p. 279) put it: “the emphasis is on a community of self-
governance and the normative literature on this type of
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governance is closely connected to long-standing themes
of subsidiarity and local control over localized problems”.
Community governance essentially reverses the
roles found in hierarchical governance, whereby com-
munity members and local governments develop policy.
Within federations, higher level governments may then
be “policy takers” who provide resources for local com-
munities to implement locally-derived plans. Given the
core principles of unity and cooperation, typical instru-
ments in the community governancemode include open
public deliberation, education campaigns to inform local
participants, direct democracy, and voluntary uptake via
civic commitment (Hall, 2011).
The key strengths of community governance are its
ability to foster outcomes that are appropriate and cus-
tomized to the local scale, as well as its procedural eq-
uity. For many environmental, cultural, and social pol-
icy issues, local autonomy is seen as the only way to
avoid problematic policies developed at higher levels
that are inappropriate for local conditions (Hall, 2011).
Procedural equity is achieved through open and transpar-
ent deliberation. The deliberative policy process in this
mode is rooted in ideals of direct democracy, the engage-
ment of fellow community members, and fewer barriers
to participation.
Community governance has limitations, however.
Foremost, it is seen as idealist and expecting too much
from local consensus (Hall, 2011). There is no doubt that
the communicative rationale at the core of community
governance is optimistic, and the ideal of local autonomy
seems decreasingly possible in the 21st century global-
ized world. Community governance may also suffer from
the same imbalance of power as networks, providing the
opportunity for limited interests within communities to
steer governance towards certain issues and visions. Fur-
ther, the communitymode of governance challenges fun-
damental constitutional structures in multilevel political
systems, such as federations. As Nederhand, Bekkers and
Voorberg (2016) point out, community governance con-
ceptualized as entirely distinct from the existing hierar-
chical “shadow of hierarchy” remains a challenge given
the presence of structural relationships between com-
munities and higher orders of governance. If community
governance is truly autonomous from higher-level au-
thorities, then there will be obvious limitations to what
it can accomplish due to limited local resources. Thus,
it is sometimes unclear as to how local actors intersect
with state structures in community governance modes.
However, what community governance chiefly provides
to the typology is the capacity to conceptualize localized
or upward-moving authority that is otherwise missing in
the downward, circular, or flat directions of the other
modes. The typology of ideal governance modes is pre-
sented in Table 1.
This section has identified and explained four ideal-
type modes of governance drawn from existing scholar-
ship, each of which embodies a distinct vision of societal
coordination, including the role of the state and appro-
priate policy instruments. Further, each mode presents
distinct actor roles regarding the initiation and imple-
mentation of actions. The next section applies the gover-
nance modes to the policy field of climate change adap-
tation, offering a framework to analyze and evaluate
adaptation governance across different impacts, sectors,
and locations.
3. Governance Modes and Climate Change Adaptation
Scholars use different frames to analyze adaptation gov-
ernance (Dewulf, 2013). Some frame adaptation as a
response to climate change impacts, with research ex-
ploring how actors can prepare for, or are adapting to,
climate-related hazards such as heatwaves (Wolf, Adger,
Lorenzoni, Abrahamson, & Raine, 2010) or urban flood-
ing (Oulahen, Mortsch, Tang, & Harford, 2015). A second
framing of adaptation focuses on sectors, exploring ef-
forts to adapt practices within specific sectors, such as
agriculture (Bryant et al., 2000), conservation (Brooke,
2008), and water (Miller & Belton, 2014). This section
outlines how the typology of governance modes pre-
sented above can be used to analyze adaptation efforts
focused on both particular impacts and within differ-
ent sectors.
The primary means of identifying the dominant
mode of governance around an adaptation initiative is
through the key actors and policy instruments. Themore
familiar an analyst is with a case the more accurately he
or she will be able to discern the nuanced mixes of the
Table 1. Typology of modes of governance.
Hierarchy Market Network Community
Direction of top-down circular (supply and horizontal bottom-up
Authority demand)
Initiating and federal, regional and government and government, private citizens, community
Implementing local governments market actors sector, and non- groups, neighbourhood
Actors governmental experts associations
Dominant Policy legislation and supply and demand; negotiated agreements, self-regulation,
Instruments regulation government market codes of practice, voluntary participation
intervention voluntary programs
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modes involved throughout the entire adaptation pro-
cess. Here we use document analysis to identify exam-
ples of each governance mode in response to the same
impact or across different sectors. While our cases of
adaptation initiatives are selected form the federal state
of Canada, the typology holds value for any constitu-
tional state with identifiable orders of government, a dis-
tinct private sector, and free-associating public and non-
governmental actors.
3.1. Adaptation Governance and Climate Change
Impacts: Extreme Precipitation
Hierarchical governance is a feasible means to coordi-
nate adaptation across sectors and scales when a govern-
ment has authority to command the behavior of societal
actors or other governments. In the case of the City of
Toronto, a municipal bylaw was passed requiring home-
owners and businesses to disconnect downspouts from
the city’s stormwater sewer system. The program began
as a voluntary initiative in 1998 but was amended to a re-
quirement in 2007 due to increased risks of urban flood-
ing (City of Toronto, 2018). The policy is enforced through
fines for non-compliance and is monitored by city by-
law officials. The downspout disconnection program is
a clear example of state authority exercised to deal im-
mediately with a risk to infrastructure with relative cer-
tainty in outcome. The policy was developed in response
to instances of basement flooding, and increased costs to
the city through the early 2000s (City of Toronto, 2007a).
Reports show that city officials recognized the voluntary
initiatives were insufficient even after considerable ef-
fort had been invested in door-to-door awareness build-
ing campaigns (City of Toronto, 2007a). Community in-
put was facilitated through the awareness-building cam-
paign, but a decision was eventually made to pursue a
mandatory disconnection program after analysis of cost
to the city and residents as estimated internally byWater
Toronto (City of Toronto, 2007a). In this case, the state
(the City of Toronto) identified a problem, developed a
solution internally within its jurisdictional capacity, and
employed a coercive policy instrument with predictable
and measurable outcomes. The downspout disconnec-
tion program is clear example of hierarchical governance
in response to climate change where the implementing
actor is the state, the policy tool is regulatory, and au-
thority moves downward.
Market-based governance responses to adaptation
are reflected in state intervention in market processes
via programs to subsidize or incentivize action, while ac-
tual responses and implementation are left to consumers
and producers. For example, responding to climate
change-induced extreme rainfall, the City of Toronto ini-
tiated a Basement Flooding Protection Subsidy Program,
which provides public funds to encourage the installa-
tion of a backwater valve for basements that are con-
nected to the city stormwater system (City of Toronto,
2017a). Similarly, the City of Mississauga’s stormwater
charge combats increased urban rainfall by levying a
fee on each property based on its impermeable sur-
face area (City of Mississauga, 2017). In these exam-
ples, the state employed a market-based tool to incen-
tivize adaptation among property owners (i.e., reduc-
ing stormwater discharge), and implementing actors are
market participants.
While the City of Mississauga’s approach was largely
state-driven, the choice of a taxation policy instrument
relies on the internal logic of market governance. In both
cases, recognition of the need for an adaptive measure
to reduce overland flowemerged from instances of flood-
ing in the Greater Toronto Area. In the Mississauga case,
the approachwas taken to influence citizen behavior and
accrue funds for infrastructure improvements, and the
taxation (seen as a user fee) was preferred over a prop-
erty tax increase to raise the same funds (City of Missis-
sauga, 2012). The programwas developed in a traditional
policy sense, whereby state directed public engagement
sought feedback, but where the agenda was still focused
and not co-produced with other participants (AECOM,
2013). The City did not aim to intervene in property de-
velopment or land use design directly, but rather to use
the tax to steer market actors toward the use of perme-
able surfaces as a means to manage climate risk.
Network governance has commonly been promoted
to address complex problems like climate change adap-
tation (Baird et al., 2016), and as a result has been
popular in Canada with the provincial and federal or-
ders of government. Much of the adaptation policy de-
velopment witnessed in Canada and other states has
emerged from intentionally designed networks of actors
(Huitema et al., 2016). Between 2007 and 2011 the Gov-
ernment of Canada operationalized six Regional Adap-
tation Collaboratives (RAC) with a clear network logic
of convening actors and sharing information around cli-
mate risks and possible adaptation responses (Henstra,
2017). Although the federal and provincial governments
played a meta-governance role in developing the net-
work, there was no intentional hierarchical structure,
and neither regulatory nor market instruments were de-
ployed or discussed at much length in RAC outputs. One
of the RACs provides an example of a network approach
to adaptation for extreme rainfall. The Prairie Regional
Adaptation Collaborative (PRAC) was a group of gov-
ernment and non-government partners jointly funded
by the Governments of Canada, Alberta, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan to “increase the capacity of municipal de-
cisions makers to integrate climate adaptation into local
planning decisions…by providing decision-makers with
regionally relevant policies, networks, knowledge, and
tools” (Parry, Taylor, Echeverria, McCandless, & Gass,
2012, p. 1). A review of PRAC’s work on stormwater re-
veals that outputs were entirely information-based and
voluntary tools were chosen to implement objectives,
such as a resilience assessment framework formunicipal-
ities (Parry et al., 2012). In this case, a network of inter-
dependent actors developed non-coercive, information-
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driven initiatives to address climate change, consistent
with the logic of network governance (Hall, 2011).
Community governance is observed where actions
are not driven by upper-level state structures, nor mar-
ket forces or complex networks of cross-sectoral actors,
but rather by place-based voluntary commitments (Hall,
2011). In the case of extreme rainfall, community gover-
nance is evidenced in low-cost, “grassroots” instruments
that require no official sanction from a higher-level au-
thority, and which are not driven by market forces. Such
initiatives include public awareness campaigns to pro-
mote permeable driveways, increased greenspace, aid
during extreme events, and property-level measures to
capture and store stormwater (e.g., cisterns). Such activ-
ities are evidenced in the work of Community Resilience
to Extreme Weather (CREW), a grassroots organization
in the Greater Toronto Area, which trains local volun-
teers to help vulnerable neighbours in the event of ex-
treme temperatures, floods, and storms (CREW, 2017).
Other initiatives include awareness building and vulner-
ability mapping. CREW’s organizational mandate makes
direct reference to “faith and the common good”, re-
flecting Jessop’s (2011) vision of community governance
as motivated by personal relationships and civic values.
The CREW community group relies on activity without
the coercion of the state, or even state presence, and
actor behavior is not predominantly driven by market
forces (CREW, 2017). Although CREW has engaged lo-
cal state structures for resources, it maintains a grass-
roots, upwards movement of authority through commu-
nity identified priorities. Voluntary actions to promote
the resilience of neighbours and community services re-
flect a commitment to community and locally derived
interests not facilitated or represented in other modes.
The four governance modes and examples are summa-
rized in Table 2.
3.2. Adaptation Governance and Policy Sectors
3.2.1. Hierarchical Governance in the Building Sector
(Toronto)
A key component of hierarchical governance is that prob-
lems and desired goals must be articulated with relative
certainty in order to legitimate command-and-control
policy approaches (Hall, 2011). This means that some
sectors, such as buildings and infrastructure, are more
conducive to hierarchical adaptation governance than
others, because they lend themselves more readily to
quantification. In identifying hierarchical adaptation gov-
ernance in a particular sector, an example can be found
in Toronto’s Green Standard program, adopted in 2010,
which imposes on builders “a set of mandatory perfor-
mance targets for the design and construction of new
developments” (City of Toronto, 2017b). Authority flows
down from the state to the building sector, members of
whichmust implement the new requirements, which are
enforced through the permit system. When the City of
Toronto experienced an extreme rainfall event in 2013,
the Green Standard programwas adjusted to focus more
on managing stormwater runoff for different categories
of development (internal corporate, low-rise and resi-
dential, and mid to high-rise). The planning processes
which must account for stormwater runoff are enforced
through issuance of permits for construction which con-
sider effective calculation of averted impact. The Green
Standard program is a clear intervention of state capac-
ity into a sector in order to foster adaptation, and it relies
on an enforceable policy instrument to do so.
3.2.2. Market Governance in the Agricultural Sector
(Manitoba)
Agriculture can be said to be an inherently adaptive and
market-driven sector, because its activities are heavily in-
fluenced by weather and climate, and practitioners have
long recognized how to alter their behaviour based on
climatic conditions. Some governments appear to har-
ness this adaptability and market logic, as evidenced
in the Government of Manitoba’s use of both govern-
ment and private incentives, compensation, and insur-
ance programs as the dominant instruments of adap-
tation governance (Manitoba Agriculture Risk Manage-
ment Task Force, 2015). These include the private Agri-
Insurance, the federal AgriStability program, and the
provincially operated AgriRecovery program. As a result,
adaptation within the agricultural sector in Manitoba is
driven mostly by government intervention into, or steer-
ing of, market behaviour and lack of regulatory com-
mand. The AgriInsurance program provides insurance
to producers in Manitoba against “uncontrollable natu-
ral perils” such as drought, flood, fire, and other haz-
Table 2.Modes of governance and adaptation to extreme precipitation.
Hierarchy Market Network Community
Action mandated user fee for non- partnership building neighbourhood awareness
downspout permeable surfaces and voluntary best and volunteer extreme
disconnection practices weather event response
Example Toronto Mandatory Mississauga Prairie Regional CREW Toronto
Downspout StormWater Charge Adaptation Collaborative: Extreme Weather
Disconnection Program Drought and Excessive Volunteers Program
Program Moisture Theme
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ards (Manitoba Agricultural Services Corporation, 2018).
The program uses the economic instrument of publicly
provided insurance to incentivize continued production
of crops in the face of climate risks. However, the pro-
gram is not mandatory and relies on the market incen-
tive of producers recognizing risk and potential loss. In
this sense the authority to adapt remains with market
participants, meaning state authority is not exerted un-
less one enters the market. The AgriInsurance program
is not a command intervention by the state, nor a net-
work of negotiation between the state and producers, as
the Manitoba and federal governments are offering the
service independently of producer uptake. The AgriInsur-
ance program does however reflect the mixing and shift-
ing of modes as an initiative develops. The program’s de-
velopment emerged largely from public-private consulta-
tions in a more networked form (Manitoba Agricultural
RiskManagement Task Force, 2015), but the eventual ini-
tiative and policy instrument supporting it are decidedly
market orientated.
3.2.3. Network Governance across Policy Sectors
(Canada)
Network adaptation governance with a sectoral lens
is evidenced most prominently in the Government of
Canada’s Adaptation Platform, a virtual community of
practice designed to convene stakeholders for adapta-
tion policy development and implementation. The Plat-
form promotes partnership and dialogue, organized into
nine specific working groups that have a sectoral lens
(e.g., energy, infrastructure, and mining). Based on the
outcomes of the Platform in 2016, a majority of the
projects have generated either “best practices” or “state
of knowledge” documents, such as vulnerability assess-
ments and literature reviews (Natural Resources Canada,
2016). Numerous projects engage large numbers of part-
ners, andmany are led by “boundary organizations” such
as the Pacific Climate Impacts Consortium (PCIC), which
bring together public, private, and civil society actors as
equal partners (Mimura et al., 2014). The initiating ac-
tors of such networked processes vary, including govern-
ment officials, major NGOs, and industry associations.
A review of all outcomes regularly published by Natu-
ral Resources Canada shows that aside from the state’s
role as convener, there are no coercive lead state ac-
tors. Within the adaptation platform information devel-
opment is paramount: sharing information around im-
pacts and vulnerabilities and industry best practices for
self-regulation are the dominant outcomes of the work-
ing groups (Natural Resources Canada, 2016).
3.2.4. Community Governance in the Food Sector
(Winnipeg)
Community governance with a sectoral lens may evolve
to address climate change vulnerabilities recognized
at the smallest scales. In Winnipeg, Manitoba, for ex-
ample, concern over climate impacts on the agricul-
tural sector and food security amongst low-income res-
idents have prompted local groups, such as Sustain-
able South Osbourne, to develop programs which fos-
ter urban resilience to climate-induced food disruption
through community-run gardens (Sustainable South Os-
bourne, 2016). Consistent with community governance,
the group looks to higher levels of government for re-
sources rather than administration. A core principle of
the organization is that the community knows best their
environment and risks and they are the rightful stake-
holders. In recent years the initiative has evolved to
include academic partners under the name South Os-
bourne Permaculture Commons. Despite relations with
state, academic, and private actors, the initiative remains
committed to a community governance led by partici-
pants of the commons via direct democratic input. The
chief instrument of action is awareness-building, par-
ticularly concerning the use of common property for
food production in order to promote co-ownership and
shared responsibility, as well as agricultural skills for fu-
ture generations. The group distinctly emphasizes auton-
omy and independence even when resources are sup-
plied from external sources. Consistent with community
governance, projects are developed through open and
participatory deliberation and are implemented bymem-
bers. Although the projects might encourage action in
other communities or at the provincial level, they re-
main focused on the community scale and voluntary ac-
tions of citizens. Notably, coercive state instruments are
not present, and Sustainable South Osbourne is driven
by a collective sharing of authority through deliberation.
Table 3 illustrates how the four governance modes are
evidences across policy sectors.
Table 3.Modes of governance and adaptation in policy sectors.
Hierarchy Market Network Community
Action mandatory construction subsidies, insurance best practices, state of autonomous community
standards and recovery funding knowledge reports food production
Example Toronto Green Standard AgriInsurance, AgriStability National Adaptation Sustainable South
and AgriRecovery Platform Mining, Osbourne Permaculture
Programs in Manitoba Infrastructure and Commons
Energy Working Groups
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4. Conclusions
4.1. Descriptive, Comparative, and Normative Value
Having shown the means by which analysts can identify
adaptationmodes of governance, it is important to again
reflect on the value of such a typology. Adaptation re-
searchers facemultiple lenses through which to view the
complex process of adaptation governance. The typology
presented here provides discrete analytical categories in
which to place the governance components of adapta-
tion. By distinguishing among actor roles, policy instru-
ments, and directions of authority, adaptation scholars
have key indicators to identify the mode of governance
at work in a particular sector or jurisdiction. In each case
there are distinct modes of governance that can be re-
ferred to, and that are more manageable than relying on
conceptualizing adaptation as complex and multiactor.
Evidently each mode is complex and multi-actor, but in
different ways, and with different strengths, weaknesses,
and ramifications.
Further, the typology allows for comparison of impor-
tant details of adaptation processes to better assess their
transferability across impacts, sectors, or locations, and
to assess the relationship between the state of adapta-
tion and the ongoing modes of governance. For exam-
ple, an effective adaptation program that is produced
largely through hierarchical governance cannot be eas-
ily transposed to a location in which elected officials
are unwilling to act on climate change. Recreating an
adaptation strategy includes more than copying instru-
ments; it requires understanding actor roles and interac-
tions that lead to policy instrument choices and a grasp
of how the governance arrangements led to the adap-
tive measure. In both Toronto and Mississauga, for ex-
ample, flooding due to intense rainfall was addressed
by the state, but with distinct logics. Both cities faced
a choice about which governance mode and policy in-
strument would best deal with the impacts of extreme
precipitation, and either could have chosen regulation or
taxation. Focusing on the operative mode of governance
and the outcomes of adaptation initiatives could illumi-
nate ways to secure desirable adaptation outcomes and
to replicate effective approaches across jurisdictions, sec-
tors and scales. The typology provides a framework for
comparison of these complex processes.
Other comparisons using the typology may include
consideration of scale. As indicated by our examples,
modes of governance for the same impact vary not only
by location, but by scale. Will most other city govern-
ments approach extreme rainfall with market tools? Will
higher-level governments consistently promote network
approaches? As adaptation initiatives proliferate, typolo-
gies like the one we have outlined here will be valuable
for analysts to compare varying approaches to similar im-
pacts and across sectors.
Finally, as discussed above, the typology allows for
clear identification of the politics of adaptation gover-
nance. Modes of governance, and their implications for
adaptation, are inherently related to visions of how soci-
ety ought to be governed, and are therefore highly nor-
mative (Dixon & Dogan, 2002, Hall, 2011). The typology
provides a frame of reference to distinguish the values at
the core of particular visions of governance. By advocat-
ing for onemode of adaptation governance over another,
actors present a vision of how we should govern climate
change adaptation and society. Recognizing this too will
help bring adaptation out of the black box.
For instance, actors who promote the use of eco-
nomic instruments (especially in the more laissez-faire
version of market governance) reflect a belief that adap-
tation is not inherently a responsibility of the state,
but an individual onus. Conversely, actors who promote
the use of regulation or legislation are advancing ideals
consistent with hierarchical governance: adaptation is a
state responsibility and compliance is paramount, given
the severity of the issue. These competing visions must
be recognized in understanding the challenges of adapta-
tion governance, which is clearly both a managerial and
political problem. Any effort to replicate adaptation ini-
tiatives cannot ignore these normative components.
4.2. Moving Forward
In embracing the governance typology grounded in an
already rich field of public policy research, adaptation
scholars may find value in explanations of why some
modes of governance do not work well with particular
problems, or why a certain mix of modes simply will not
work at all (Rhodes, 1997). Combining aspects of differ-
ent governance modes might be problematic for norma-
tive reasons, such as described above, or because of com-
peting internal logics of effective governance. In their ap-
plication of the typology to policing in the UK and Aus-
tralia, Fleming and Rhodes (2005, p. 203) argued that:
“the future will not lie with either markets, or hierarchies
or networks but all three. The trick will not be tomanage
contracts or steer networks but to mix the three systems
effectively when they conflict with and undermined one
another”. Adding the community governancemode of ty-
pology, this future ofmixing appears to be relevant to the
field of adaptation. This mixing may ultimately be a role
for governments, which are uniquely equipped with the
authority, legitimacy, and resources to combine aspects
of these governance modes. Recognizing the strengths
and weaknesses that each mode embodies is a critical
first step.
The added benefit of using a typology with such a
long history is that the well-known strengths and weak-
nesses of the four modes can be considered when devel-
oping adaptation initiatives. It can be expected that the
uncertainty surrounding many climate change impacts
limits the utility of a hierarchical logic, and this uncer-
tainty shifts expectations about policies, so the flexibility
of networks may be necessary. However, the relative in-
efficiency of networks might make them insufficient to
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achieve the transformation required of major public in-
frastructure and economic behaviour in order to reduce
vulnerability (Lonsdale, Pringle, & Turner, 2015), so mar-
kets or hierarchy may be required. Finally, adaptation
will not occur outside the contexts of community histo-
ries, geography, and values, so effortsmust be developed
while cognizant of even the smallest scales.
Ultimately, we hope that engagement with the typol-
ogy, the internal logics of actor roles and appropriate pol-
icy instruments leads to increased conceptual clarity in
the analysis of the governance of climate change adap-
tation, but also the politics of the governance of climate
change. This article responds to the argument critique
made by various scholars that adaptation governance is
too often discussedwith reference to structural function-
alismand a “black boxing” of the political nature of gover-
nance (Biesbroek et al., 2015;Wellstead et al., 2013).We
hope that in applying a well-developed typology of gov-
ernance, the field can mature to better interrogate the
processes, outcomes, and competing philosophies of ac-
tor roles, relations, institutions, and policy instruments
in climate change adaptation.
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